Much fawning over little Ada. She’s quite a pretty baby, and rather anxious.
Fortunately, she’s calmed by the
“Lava” song. I’ve heard it played to her fifteen times in the last three days.
(Mary has made a playlist of Hawaiian music for Ada. I suggested adding the version of
“Nothing Compares 2 U” performed by the Coconutz, from the movie
Forgetting Sarah Marshall.)
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Yesterday, West Ham United enacted one of the nicer
pre-goal buildups I’d seen in some time. I was pleased when the ball went in the net. (Crystal Palace won the game, however.)
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
My Uncle Tim lent a textbook I’ve long wanted to peruse:
The Norton Introduction to Philosophy (second edition).
A few remarks:
(1) The body text fonts are quite small. One doesn’t get the same impression previewing the pages online.
(2) Surely, much of the painstaking editorial content has been honed over dozens or hundreds of class lectures. Some of it, however, seems too opinionated:
Paley’s argument is sometimes taken to be an argument from analogy. … But arguments from analogy are notoriously weak. (27–28)
I can’t find any
explanation of why such arguments are weak.
Instead, an
example is offered:
Living things are like watches. Watches are made in factories. Therefore, living things are made in factories. (28)
But an example of a bad
inductive argument is offered, too:
In the past, every time a presidential election has been held in the United States, the winning candidate has been a man. Therefore, in the future, every time a presidential election is held in the United States, the winning candidate will be a man. (xlix)
What’s more, concede the editors, it “turns out to be impossible” for there to be “some formal test for distinguishing the good inductive arguments from the bad ones” (xlix, cont.).
The editors suggest that this difficulty is handled by “the theory of statistical inference.” But, as far as I can tell, they don’t say what this theory is or how it handles the difficulty. Still, they issue no blanket condemnation of induction.
There may be a powerful reason for holding that analogical arguments are much less adequate than inductive ones; however, an explanation accessible to beginners is lacking. Such an explanation may be impossible to provide. My complaint, though, is that readers are left to take the comparative inadequacy of analogical argumentation on faith,
though it isn’t admitted that this is what they’re left to do.
(3) Speaking of faith, the volume mixes classic readings with new articles that spell out “cutting edge” positions on the same topics; and faith is the topic of the article that I read tonight, “When Is Faith Rational?” by Lara Buchak.
There is much to commend Buchak’s view, and I think its gist probably is intelligible to the bright undergraduate reader who perseveres to the last page. The presentation is also helped by some well-chosen examples.
Alas, at key argumentative steps, the article simply refers to formal presentations in Buchak’s other work. This is unhelpful to readers who’ll have little further exposure to philosophy. Interesting and relevant though Buchak’s view may be, I worry that the
argument for it just isn’t accessible to the book’s intended readers.
Perhaps, also,
other new readings have been included because they present views that, like Buchak’s, are exciting and “trendy” and maybe even true, rather than because they help the novice to learn to philosophize. But I wouldn’t accept this conclusion purely on the basis of analogy. I’d have to read more of the volume to find out.
