Semifinals: France 0, Spain 2; England 1, Argentina 2
Which manager was worse?
(I) Thomas Tuchel, for:
(a) ceasing to attack …
and
(b) permitting Messi & Co. to hammer away at the English goal …
for forty minutes;
OR:
(II) Didier Deschamps, for:
having no response for anything that Spain did.
I vote: Deschamps. This is the second time he has “crashed the Ferrari” in the World Cup. (I’m not considering France’s Euro defeats.)
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Deschamps almost “crashed the Ferrari” in the 2018 World Cup final. The Croatians were passing through the French at will, and had scored once. But then the referee gave France a second goal.
Deschamps’s tactics with France always have been simple.
(1) He fields three or four prodigious scorers – even if they don’t maintain possession, defend, etc. He values their scoring so much that he requires little else of them.
(2) He overpopulates the defense. He prefers central midfielders and fullbacks who are defensive specialists. (That is putting it kindly; at times, he seems to prefer that they have offensive limitations.)
(3) He ignores transitional midfield play. He figures that as long as (a) his attackers seize on mistakes and put in goals and (b) his defensive multitudes keep goals out, the middle of the field doesn’t matter.
In short, he gambles on offensive talent, which of course France has in spades.
Well, these tendencies bit him in 2022, against Argentina, and again in this tournament, against Spain. The vaunted attackers weren’t outplayed, exactly. Rather, the opposing midfielders cut off their supply. I had expected that Mbappé, Dembélé, et al. should have enough chances provided them. Everyone expected this. Instead, they were starved. Rodri, Ruiz, and Olmo – great players – bossed the middle. But they were aided by Deschamps’s willingness to abdicate that zone.
Halfway through, it was clear that France sorely missed the few polyfunctional midfielders employed during Deschamps’s tenure:
I said, at the beginning of the tournament, that the French could win any match with just twenty good minutes. Spain granted five. By then, for France, it was too late.
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Spain’s midfield is tactically and technically superb; but so is Argentina’s. And Argentina has grit, grit, grit. Only the Croatians approximate them. This should be a fascinating final. I’ll put my money on Argentina; I don’t know if these Spaniards have encountered an opponent with such a will to win. But I wouldn’t mind if Spain won. Both these teams are worthy.
(I) Thomas Tuchel, for:
(a) ceasing to attack …
and
(b) permitting Messi & Co. to hammer away at the English goal …
for forty minutes;
OR:
(II) Didier Deschamps, for:
having no response for anything that Spain did.
I vote: Deschamps. This is the second time he has “crashed the Ferrari” in the World Cup. (I’m not considering France’s Euro defeats.)
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Deschamps almost “crashed the Ferrari” in the 2018 World Cup final. The Croatians were passing through the French at will, and had scored once. But then the referee gave France a second goal.
Deschamps’s tactics with France always have been simple.
(1) He fields three or four prodigious scorers – even if they don’t maintain possession, defend, etc. He values their scoring so much that he requires little else of them.
(2) He overpopulates the defense. He prefers central midfielders and fullbacks who are defensive specialists. (That is putting it kindly; at times, he seems to prefer that they have offensive limitations.)
(3) He ignores transitional midfield play. He figures that as long as (a) his attackers seize on mistakes and put in goals and (b) his defensive multitudes keep goals out, the middle of the field doesn’t matter.
In short, he gambles on offensive talent, which of course France has in spades.
Well, these tendencies bit him in 2022, against Argentina, and again in this tournament, against Spain. The vaunted attackers weren’t outplayed, exactly. Rather, the opposing midfielders cut off their supply. I had expected that Mbappé, Dembélé, et al. should have enough chances provided them. Everyone expected this. Instead, they were starved. Rodri, Ruiz, and Olmo – great players – bossed the middle. But they were aided by Deschamps’s willingness to abdicate that zone.
Halfway through, it was clear that France sorely missed the few polyfunctional midfielders employed during Deschamps’s tenure:
- Griezzman, an attacker who knew when to drop back, so as to defend and to build up play. (Retired.)
- Kanté, ball-winner extraordinaire who also could jump-start the attack. (Too old; languishing on the bench.)
- Camavinga. (Left at home.)
I said, at the beginning of the tournament, that the French could win any match with just twenty good minutes. Spain granted five. By then, for France, it was too late.
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
Spain’s midfield is tactically and technically superb; but so is Argentina’s. And Argentina has grit, grit, grit. Only the Croatians approximate them. This should be a fascinating final. I’ll put my money on Argentina; I don’t know if these Spaniards have encountered an opponent with such a will to win. But I wouldn’t mind if Spain won. Both these teams are worthy.
