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1996, the best year in movie history, pt. 103: The young poisoner’s handbook

My dear grandpa (R.I.P.) would have disliked this morbid, cynical movie.

It recounts the career of serial murderer Graham Young – or, rather, it embellishes it. It makes it downright funny. Some of the movie’s characters and events are admitted to be fictitious. Other happenings – even some of the murders – are, officially, mere speculation.


For an account that purports to be more factual, if not less sensational, see “The Teacup Poisoner” (Fred Dinenage: Murder Casebook, season 1, episode 2).


The Young Poisoner’s Handbook is more like an inverted morality play.

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

The movie is not, as Roger Ebert would have it, “a wickedly satirical view of ambition in a gifted, if misguided, youth.”

Satire and ambition: let’s consider these notions in turn.

The purpose of satire is to correct behavior. It assumes that redemption is possible. This movie appears to take the contrary view. It isn’t satire; it’s the bleakest kind of irony. (I could tell you what kind if I knew Northrop Frye’s literary taxonomy better.)

Ambition isn’t this protagonist’s driving motive; it’s his smokescreen. Graham (Hugh O’Conor) has genuine scientific interests, but his self-portrayal as a scientist is largely a pose. He tries to convince his prison psychologist that, deep down, he’s a sensitive soul who has permitted his yearning for knowledge to lead him too far, as if he’d only added heavy metals to people’s food and drink out of scientific curiosity.

Graham tries to convince himself of this, too. But he knows too well that he’s essentially a vindictive little cuss.

Alas, the psychologist decides that Graham is no longer homicidal and arranges Graham’s release from the prison hospital where he has been confined since his teens.

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

The movie has three acts:

One: Early misdeeds

Two: Confinement

Three: Release

In each act, the object of satire – or, more accurately, of ferocious contempt – isn’t Graham himself so much as his social environment. Yes, Graham does terrible things, but he does them to silly, grotesque people. They are always the butt of the joke.

Take Graham’s best school friend, who brags about his forthcoming date with the girl that has captured Graham’s attention (a serial flirt). This friend has the habit of asking Graham to swap sandwiches with him. (An outlandishly reckless habit, if you adopt Graham’s point of view.)

Soon this friend is laid up in bed. Graham escorts the girl to a music hall, where she beams worshipfully at the crooner.


But then Graham’s supper-talk is too gruesome for the girl, and she flees. For all her insinuation, she’s disappointingly ordinary, after all.

Next, consider Graham’s family members, who appear to have been dreamed up by Roald Dahl. They park in front of the television while Graham experiments upstairs with his chemistry equipment. These philistines have the gall to complain that Graham’s chemicals have fouled up the tea-set. Even though it’s his sister’s fault! (She has been mixing together face-creams in the teacups.)

Graham puts something nasty in his sister’s eyedrops.

Then Graham’s stepmother – Ruth Sheen, at her most acrid – finds some dirty magazines in the house. Graham’s father guiltily lowers his eyes, but it’s Graham who’s blamed. His stepmother scrubs him down in the bath and destroys his precious chemistry set.

Not long afterward, she’s bent over with stomach pain. Her hair falls out. Never lovely, she becomes hideous and weak.

Graham volunteers to spoon-feed her. Too feeble to protest, she peers out in terror at her family.


It doesn’t end well for the stepmother.

Graham’s subsequent confinement in the prison hospital is not unlike Paul Pennyfeather’s, in Evelyn Waugh’s Decline and Fall. We’re treated to the same bureaucratic dispute of that novel – rehabilitationism vs. disciplinarianism. The argument is rehearsed by hospital officials in front of the the inmates themselves, who, in a really clever scene, are locked up in a row of steam-baths so that only their heads are visible. We’re reminded of Dante and Virgil having it out over self-excusing sinners. (Silver-tongued these souls may be, but they are buried in mud.)


The harshest treatment is reserved for Graham’s victims of Act Three – his senior colleagues in the firm that employs him after he is released. They are ordinary factory workers. Some are cruel; some are kind; all are tawdry.

In one late scene, Graham sits on a grassy bank next to a reservoir, a bottle of poison in his hand. The implication is that he wishes to take revenge on all of society.

What damage might emptying the bottle do? Graham can’t know. It’s one thing to monitor subjects one at a time, measuring the dosage slipped into each victim’s tea and finding out and recording each bodily symptom. It’s something else altogether to pour poison into the general water supply. The effects couldn’t be inferred from the prior experiments. Nor would Graham be able to observe them.

Graham isn’t a sincere experimenter. He just wants to hurt. And the movie comes uncomfortably close to suggesting that his victims – indeed, that all members of society – deserve their suffering.

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Pauline Kael, in her famous review of A Clockwork Orange, says:
The trick of making the attacked less human than their attackers, so you feel no sympathy for them, is, I think, symptomatic of a new attitude in movies. This attitude says there’s no moral difference. Stanley Kubrick has assumed the deformed, self-righteous perspective of a vicious young punk who says, “Everything’s rotten. Why shouldn’t I do what I want? They’re worse than I am.” In their new mood (perhaps movies in their cumulative effect are partly responsible for it), people want to believe the hyperbolic worst, want to believe in the degradation of the victims – that they are dupes and phonies and weaklings. I can’t accept that Kubrick is merely reflecting this post-assassinations, post-Manson mood; I think he’s catering to it. I think he wants to dig it.
It’s an interesting question whether The Young Poisoner’s Handbook “wants to dig it.” Certainly, it presents the victims as “dupes and phonies and weaklings.” What it doesn’t do is glorify the victimizer. Graham is vicious, but, unlike A Clockwork Orange’s protagonist, he’s not a tough person; he wouldn’t instigate a physical fight. His choice of weapon betrays his cowardice. Nor does he dress or speak boldly. He’s essentially an overly formal, petulant little boy brandishing a chemistry set that has all the awesomeness of a model train.

Does this difference make the movie less or more misanthropic? At least in Kubrick’s Clockwork Orange, there’s one alluring character – even if he is a ruthless Nietzschean “overman.” The protagonist of The Young Poisoner’s Handbook has considerably less attraction.

There’s one way to avoid interpreting this movie as an expression of pure misanthropy, and that is to insist that since Graham is the narrator, everything is seen through jaundiced eyes. The key is to look for details that Graham doesn’t emphasize in his narration. Graham, we observe, is a Nazi enthusiast. But very little is made of this. We just know it because of some pictures on his wall. An obsession with Hitler was a large part of the historical Graham Young’s life. But when Graham tells us his story, he leaves it out. It’s as if he’s back with his prison psychologist, eliciting sympathy, omitting details on purpose, making his victims seem worse than they are.

What the movie shows us, then, is a weakling who tears down other people, in his thoughts and with his deeds – but always at some remove – to compensate for his own smallness. This leaves us with one contemptible figure, not a contemptible whole world. But, wicked though he may be, since he’s just one small person, he can’t deprive us of the magnanimity or the resources to pity even one such as himself – should we choose to do so.

An alleged fallacy

I’ve been enjoying Part One (“Ancient Philosophy”) of Anthony Kenny’s four-part New History of Philosophy. The selection and arrangement of themes is pretty tidy, and in one passage – the conclusion of the epistemological chapter – it’s almost breathtaking how the dominoes topple over.
The study of ancient epistemology can teach us much about the nature of knowledge and the limits of scepticism. Several insights became part of the patrimony of all future philosophy: knowledge can only be of what is true; knowledge is only knowledge if it can appeal implicitly or explicitly to some kind of support, whether from experience, reasoning, or some other source; and one who claims knowledge must be resolute, excluding the possibility of being rightly converted, at a later stage, to a different view.

However, ancient epistemology is bedevilled by two different but related fallacies. Both of them are generated by a misunderstanding of the truth that whatever is knowledge must be true. One of the fallacies haunts classical epistemology, up to the time of Aristotle; the other fallacy haunts Hellenistic and imperial epistemology.

The first fallacy is this. “Whatever is knowledge must be true” may be interpreted in two ways:

(1) Necessarily, if p is known, p is true

or

(2) If p is known, p is necessarily true.

(1) is true but (2) is false. It is a necessary truth that if I know you are sitting down, then you are sitting down; but if I know you are sitting down it is not a necessary truth that you are sitting down; you may get up at any moment. Plato and Aristotle, over and over again, seem to regard (2) as indistinguishable from (1). Given the necessary connection between knowledge and truth, they seem to think, only what is necessary can be known. From the acceptance of (2) there flows the construction of the theory of eternal and immutable Ideas, and there flows the impossible ideal of Aristotelian science.

If whatever is knowledge must be true, then it may seem that knowledge must be the exercise of a faculty that cannot err. This is the form that the fallacy takes in Hellenistic times. The Epicureans and Stoics, unlike Plato and Aristotle, are prepared to countenance knowledge not just of eternal truths, but of mundane contingencies such as that Dion is now walking. But this, they claim, is possible only if we have faculties – whether sense or reason – that are capable of infallible operation. The Hellenistic fallacy is just the mirror image of the classical fallacy. Let F stand for some faculty. Then it is true that

It is impossible, if F knows that p, that F has gone wrong.

But that is not the same as, nor is it true that,

If F knows that p, then it was impossible for F to go wrong.

The epistemological fallacy, both in its classical and in its Hellenistic form, would cast long shadows through philosophy’s history.
If Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and (presumably, for centuries) their descendents all really were confused on this point, then: Oof.

I raise my sons

Little Abel has been feverish; his napping has been so fitful, he hasn’t remained asleep when I’ve tried to separate my body from his. Today he was less ill but just as unwilling to be parted from me. The household chores have suffered; my reading and writing “projects” have suffered; Abel’s napping “schedule,” insofar as one exists, has suffered. In the afternoons, I’ve had to haul him, at his groggiest, down the block to retrieve Samuel from the bus.

Samuel has brought home a workbook of optional math exercises. Most days, I force him to complete a few pages. He screams bloody murder but then settles down and does them easily enough.

Daniel, the middle child, finds ways to claim attention. He and I discuss the English and Spanish alphabets. He firmly believes in che, elle, and erre, although the Real Academia Española disavowed those letters in the mid-1990s. Alas, Daniel follows YouTube, not his father. His Spanish is therefore overcomplicated. His approach to reading in either language is downright glacial. He can sound out syllables but has to pause to lecture me about every letter. I tell him it’s no way to form words, let alone whole sentences. What really would suit him is a language of pictographs and ideographs. His calligraphy is rather good; he might learn to design type before he can read it.

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Most days, Abel and Daniel are good friends. They play and bathe together. Daniel has given them superhero bathing names: “Soap Man” and “Bubble Man.” Abel likes to pour water out of the tub and onto the bathroom floor.

When Abel is old enough, I’ll take them all outside and force them to run around the track that belongs to the school down the street. The two younger boys, especially Daniel, already like to run around the shed in our yard. They didn’t like to before, but I persuaded them with reverse psychology or some such trick.

Following a tumultuous afternoon: a conversation with my chastened first-grader

Samuel: “Look at what I’m drawing, Dad.”

He shows me his LCD drawing tablet.

John-Paul: “Is that a ‘peace’ sign?”

Samuel: “Yes. Today is International Peace Day.”

John-Paul: “So it is. Did you learn that at school?”

Samuel: “Yes.”

I briefly reflect on this country’s warring. I decide to let it pass.

John-Paul: “That’s good.”

Samuel: “I’m drawing this ‘peace’ sign to calm myself.”

He’s banned from TV this evening.

Samuel: “Now I’m turning the ‘peace’ sign into a crying emoji.”

He does.

He presses the button to clear the screen.

Samuel: “I’m writing with a colored pencil because I’ve lost the stylus.”

I hadn’t known, or had forgotten, that the instrument is called a stylus.

He shows me the screen. He has written:

peace = calm

Return to me!

Every day this week, Samuel has come home from school expecting to have received the latest issue of his (free) Lego magazine. No luck. I share in his disappointment.

Today, then, we were happy to find a magazine in our mailbox.

But it wasn’t the Lego magazine. It was an unexpected, free issue of Harper’s.

Eveloping the regular cover was an outer cover, on which was printed this enticement:
Dear Former Subscriber:

Remember the story of the prodigal son? How his father put on a feast and welcomed him back with open arms?

Well, that’s what we at Harper’s want to do for you.

Instead of setting a sumptuous table, we’ve come up with something far more satisfying: a money-saving opportunity to subscribe to Harper’s at the lowest available rate!

Restart your subscription today and get a full year of Harper’s (12 issues) for only $14.97 – that’s 86% off the annual newsstand price. You save $92.91 just by saying YES!
And so on.

I have to say, I’m put off. Harper’s Magazine is not my Heavenly Father.

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

P.S. Even so: In the pretentious field of long-form journalism, Harper’s achieves a kind of modesty by going out of the way to pose as what, in Peppa Pig, is referred to as a “clever-clogs.” (The “clever-clogs” in Peppa Pig is Edmund Elephant.) The Harper’s style is to dress up serious reportage or reflection in snark.

Harper’s plays the wise fool.

The quintessential Harper’s article is Bertrand Russell’s “In Praise of Idleness” (1932).

Articles mentioned on this issue’s cover:

“Revolt in the Heartland: Can Old-Time Populism Save the Country?”

“Ghost Towns of the Darién Gap”

“On the Front Lines of Canada’s Ostrich War” (didn’t the Australians have an ostrich war? No, they fought the emus)

That I’ve been a more faithful subscriber of Harper’s than of, say, The Atlantic, The New Yorker, or The New York Review of Books surely reflects my own penchant for off-the-wall self-effacement.

Or that I’m a cheapskate. Those other mags are pricey.

Now that I’m old

Three books by Tim Mulgan, a future-minded philosopher before “longtermism” was in vogue:

(1) Future People: A Moderate Consequentialist Account of Our Obligations to Future Generations (2006)

(2) Ethics for a Broken World: Imagining Philosophy after Catastrophe (2011)

(3) Philosophy for an Ending World (2024)

The trajectory is not encouraging.

About a decade ago, I read and enjoyed several chapters of the middle book, Ethics for a Broken World. I would read that book again. I wish I could teach it to students of the past. I’m less sure about today’s and tomorrow’s students. The book is a series of “lectures” about late-20th- and early-21st-century moral and political philosophy, delivered to university students in the (ravaged) future three or four generations hence. Even this bleak scenario now seems naïvely optimistic. It assumes that there will be students in the (ravaged) future.

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E. H. Carr, in What Is History?, says:
The historian belongs not to the past but to the present. Professor Trevor-Roper tells us that the historian “ought to love the past.” This is a dubius injunction. To love the past may easily be an expression of the nostalgic romanticism of old men and old societies, a symptom of loss of faith and interest in the present or future. Cliché for cliché, I should prefer the one about freeing oneself from “the dead hand of the past.” The function of the historian is neither to love the past nor to emancipate himself from the past, but to master and understand it as the key to the understanding of the present.
Now that I’m an old man of forty-four, not hopeful for the (this-worldly) future or much enjoying or understanding the present – at least as it exists outside my household – the past does seem more lovely. The picturesque past, that is. If this makes me an unfit historian, so be it.

September’s poem

A.I. could kill everyone before the decade ends, tech experts believe (or so a whistleblower claims). We all lose: not just this or that way of life, but life itself.

Of all the stupid ways to go.

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯
The smith with the tongs both worketh in the coals,
and fashioneth it with hammers,
and worketh it with the strength of his arms:
yea, he is hungry, and his strength faileth:
he drinketh no water, and is faint.
The carpenter stretcheth out his rule:
he marketh it out with a line:
he fitteth it with planes,
and he marketh it out with the compass,
and maketh it after the figure of a man,
according to the beauty of a man;
that it may remain in the house.
He heweth him down cedars,
and taketh the cypress and the oak,
which he strengtheneth for himself among the trees of the forest:
he planteth an ash, and the rain doth nourish it.
Then shall it be for a man to burn:
for he will take thereof, and warm himself;
yea, he kindleth it, and baketh bread;
yea, he maketh a god, and worshippeth it:
he maketh it a graven image, and falleth down thereto.
He burneth part thereof in the fire:
with part thereof he eateth flesh:
he roasteth roast, and is satisfied:
yea, he warmeth himself, and saith,
‘Aha, I am warm, I have seen the fire’.
And the residue thereof he maketh a god,
even his graven image:
he falleth down unto it, and worshippeth it,
and prayeth unto it, and saith,
‘Deliver me; for thou art my god’.
They have not known nor understood:
for he hath shut their eyes, that they cannot see;
and their hearts, that they cannot understand.
And none considereth in his heart,
neither is there knowledge nor understanding to say,
‘I have burned part of it in the fire,
yea, also I have baked bread upon the coals thereof:
I have roasted flesh, and eaten it:
and shall I make the residue thereof an abomination?
shall I fall down to the stock of a tree?’
He feedeth of ashes:
a deceived heart hath turned him aside,
that he cannot deliver his soul,
nor say, ‘Is there not a lie in my right hand?’
‘Remember these, O Jacob and Israel,
for thou art my servant:
I have formed thee: thou art my servant,
O Israel, thou shalt not be forgotten of me.
I have blotted out, as a thick cloud, thy transgressions,
and, as a cloud, thy sins:
return unto me, for I have redeemed thee.’
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯

(Isaiah 44:12–22, KJV; line-breaking and punctuation of The New Cambridge Paragraph Bible)

“And the residue thereof he maketh a god, / even his graven image: / he falleth down unto it, and worshippeth it, / and prayeth unto it, and saith, / ‘Deliver me; for thou art my god’.”

Body-text fonts, pt. 55: Apollo

Shockingly, this is my first exhibition of the great Adrian Frutiger’s work. Behold.


Very nice, but one must tolerate long descenders. Observe the lowercase ps, qs, ys, and, especially, js (“jolly good job”). (The specimen is from a story by Francis Wyndham.)

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

The household is watching Young Sherlock Holmes (1985) in installments: our attention spans are not long. The movie is faux-British. Barry Levinson, Chris Columbus, and Steven Spielberg are named in the opening credits.

Holmes and Watson are schoolmates. The school is proto-Hogwarts. There is a very picturesque scene with all the boys dressed for dinner in the Great Hall. The camera lingers over the table at which the Masters are seated. It cherishes their extreme decrepitude.

In other scenes, old men are injected with poisoned darts that cause them to hallucinate and kill themselves. The hallucinations involve the coming to life of chicken dinners, hatstands, and stained-glass windows.

Little Daniel excuses himself during these scenes.

“New America”

The politicians of New Mexico have responded to Trump’s latest proposal.

♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Samuel has been complaining about the wasting of his time. E.g., when someone else chooses a video to watch, that person is “wasting my [Samuel’s] time.”

He can be rather sweet about it, however.

“Mom is working [napping, etc.]. She is wasting my time.” He clarifies: “I wish I could to talk to her instead.”

Evelyn Waugh, Scoop:
He had published eight books … beginning with a life of Rimbaud written when he was eighteen, and concluding, at the moment, with Waste of Time, a studiously modest description of some harrowing months among the Patagonian Indians.
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦

Daniel: “Mommy, I am going to bed, and [the letter] A is going to spend the night with me. Can you carry me and A to bed?”

Aztecs

Two books:

(1) Inga Clendinnen, Aztecs: An Interpretation (1991), reviewed by the Psmiths;

and

(2) Pablo of Texcoco, How to Be Grateful: An Aztec Guide to the Art of Gratitude (2025), reviewed at NDPR.

It was jarring to come across both reviews in the same week. It was like reading about Nazis and then learning that a collection of mid-20th-century Germanic homespun “wisdom” had just been issued by a major university press.

The “Nazi” remark isn’t a cheap exaggeration. Clendinnen’s work unavoidably brings the Holocaust to mind.

Still, the analogy isn’t perfect, especially when it’s applied to the other book. Pablo’s “wisdom” was written down quite a few years after the Spanish conquered the Aztecs. Would we demand that every postwar Germanic writer address the sorrowful legacy of the Nazi period? If not, then perhaps we shouldn’t object when Pablo and his 21st-century expositors choose not to dwell on the same Aztec qualities that Clendinnen describes.

Perhaps the introduction of Christianity into Nahua culture accounts for the surprising gentleness of the “Pablo” book.

Or perhaps not. It’s not unheard of for the same people to manifest brutality and exquisite etiquettical sensitivity.

How does Clendinnen’s work go down these days? Her scholarship is impossible to ignore. I fear that she is becoming unfashionable, however. I see that in the second (2022) edition of The Mexico Reader, the selection from Clendinnen has been considerably shortened.

(The article it is taken from is here.)